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KIERKEGAARD ON RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY:
THE PROBLEM OF THE CRITERION
C. Stephen Evans

This paper explores the important role authority plays in the religious
thought of S0ren Kierkegaard. In contrast to dominant modes of thought in
both modern and postmodern philosophy, Kierkegaard considers the religious authority inherent in a special revelation from God to be the fundamental source of religious truth. The question as to how a genuine religious
authority can be recognized is particularly difficult for Kierkegaard, since
rational evaluation of authorities could be seen as a rejection of that authority in favor of the authority of reason. However, I argue that Kierkegaard
does offer criteria for recognizing a genuine religious authority. I explore
these criteria and try to show they are helpful, but I argue that there is no
principled reason he should not accept other criteria he rejects, such as the
criterion of miracles. In conclusion, I suggest that both the criteria offered by
Kierkegaard and the method by which they are derived require us to question certain Enlightenment views as to what should count as "rational."

Claims to religious authority are rightly regarded with suspicion in the
contemporary world. The tragedy of Heaven's Gate, in which forty-one
people committed to the authority of Marshall Applewhite committed suicide, clearly shows the dangers of uncritically accepting a religious authority. Such a tragedy raises pressing questions about whether it is possible to
distinguish legitimate and illegitimate forms of religious authority, and if it
is possible, how to make the distinction. In this paper I shall examine some
of the roles the concept of authority plays in Kierkegaard's writings. I shall
try to show that while Kierkegaard is well aware of the dangers posed by
religious authority, he is committed to the claim that Christian faith is irreducibly tied to claims to authority. I shall also look at some of the criteria
he suggests for distinguishing genuine from illegitimate claims to authority, and try to assess the adequacy of those criteria in light of the contemporary situation.
Kierkegaard attempts to draw a sharp distinction between beliefs and
actions grounded in an authoritative revelation and those based on reason.
However, this sharp distinction is undermined by his own attempt to show
that an acceptance of authority is not arbitrary. Specifically, Kierkegaard,
in writing about the case of a Danish pastor deposed for claiming to have
had a special revelation, offers criteria for recognizing a genuine revelation.
Though these criteria are negative in character and certainly offer no proof
that a revelation is genuine and therefore deserving of recognition as an
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authority, I argue that they are rational criteria and are in fact quite similar
to traditional criteria offered by such thinkers as Thomas Aquinas. Once
this is realized, there is no principled reason why Kierkegaard should not
employ other rational criteria in differentiating a genuine revelation from
spurious ones. Therefore, the crucial role played by authority in
Kierkegaard's thought does not commit him to any form of irrationalism.
In conclusion, however, I argue that the rational criteria Kierkegaard
offers require us to rethink what is meant by "reason" in this context. On a
classical foundationalist conception of reason, criteria for revelation should
be developed antecedently to and independently of any recognition of any
commitment to a particular revelation, so as to serve as a foundational justification for such a commitment. Kierkegaard's criteria do not meet this
requirement, and must be viewed as criteria that are in part developed with
the help of reflection on commitments already made to a revelation viewed
as authoritative. Such a stance, though it fails to satisfy the rationalistic aspirations of classical foundationalism, is not irrationalist, however, since one
can argue, following Roderick Chisholm, tIlat it is consistent with the way
epistemological criteria are developed in other areas of human concern.
I. Postmodernism, Modernity, and Appeals to Authority

Many would allege that a quest for a distinction between genuine and
illegitimate religious authority is a huge mistake, for such a quest seems to
assume that authority can be legitimate. Such critics would allege that the
concept of authority is irredeemable; what is needed is not a criterion for
distinguishing justified from unjustified authority but the rejection of
authority altogether.
One might think that this kind of rejection of authority is the trademark
of Enlightenment thinking, and that a postmodern age might be more
open to authority than the Enlightenment, with its prejudice against prejudices, to recall Gadamer's indictment of modem philosophy. Perhaps this
should be so, but in reality here postmodernism shows itself to be a true
child of modernity. At least for many postmodern thinkers, the heart of
the movement lies in its refusal to accept the idea that there are privileged
points of view.
I shall take John Caputo as a representative postmodern thinker here
and Caputo puts it this way: "No form of Wahrheit has any rights or privileges over any other. We lack the standpoint and the right to make such a
judgment."l Since one might reasonably think that the very essence of
authority lies in a privileging of some standpoint, this seems to imply that
authority must be rejected altogether.
Caputo does express the postmodern suspicion of Enlightenment claims
to know the Truth, or disclose the meaning of Being. But it is worth noting
that the Enlightenment quest for a rational foundation for human life had
its origins in a fear of the violence and intolerance sparked by the religious
wars of the post-reformation era, with the contending parties each claiming to possess an absolute authority. The Enlightenment saw reason as a
basis for tolerance, a way to eliminate oppression and terror.
If postmodernists have come to see that intolerance and oppression can
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masquerade under the label of reason, it does not mean that they are
inherently friendly to the claims of authority reason was supposed to subvert. Rather, it wishes to advance the cause of tolerance and liberation the
Enlightenment embraced by rejecting the whole notion of a final truth or
"metanarrative." It does so on the grounds that such final truths do not in
fact represent the outcome of a timeless, objective truth-seeking faculty,
but represent an attempt by yet another particular perspective to tyrannize over its rivals and disguise its tyranny in the process. Nor is this seen
as a purely abstract debate; the problem is fundamentally that "blood is
usually shed in the name of Being, God, or truth ... "2
Caputo appeals to Kierkegaard as a philosopher who has come to live
with what he calls "the flux." It is a little hard to decide exactly what the
flux amounts to, but perhaps the difficulty is appropriate, since the flux is
linked to "undecidability." Whatever this is, it is vital to what Caputo calls
"chastened, postmetaphysical faith."3 Without the flux, "faith becomes a
dangerous dogmatism."" He is particularly critical of a religious view that
thinks "in terms of a gift of grace given only to a chosen people." In such a
case "religion begins to degenerate into a factional power and a force of
oppression.'" It looks as if Caputo would regard any claim that God has
been revealed in a particular way to a particular people as inherently dogmatic and oppressive. Yet it is precisely such a particularist claim that distinguishes appeals to religious authority from Enlightenment appeals to
universal reason. Hence, whether we look at the issue from modernity's
rationalistic perspective or the suspicious perspective of postmodernism,
religious authority appears to be a dubious place to stand. However,
Kierkegaard wants to claim that the problem of his time, the crucial
"calamity of the age," is "not doubt about the truth of the religious but
insubordination to the authority of the religious."6

1L The Centrality of Religious Authority for Kierkegaard
I shall not attempt here to argue at any length for the centrality of the concept of religious authority for Kierkegaard. Though the concept may not
receive a great deal of overt attention in the pseudonymous works, it is clearlya dominant underlying theme, insofar as the concept of authority is linked
to the notion of divine revelation. The problem of authority lies behind
Abraham's difficulties in Fear and Trembling, since implicit in his willingness
to sacrifice Isaac is his conviction that God has called him to do this and
authorized him to do this. Abraham's inability to justify or explain his
actions is linked to the way the action is rooted in God's revelation to him, a
revelation that cannot be justified or explained by appeal to rational criteria.
The concept of authority is also present in a suppressed manner in
Philosophical Fragments, where the ironical thought-experiment sees the disciple of the God who has appeared in time as owing everything to the God.
Such a disciple must be seen as one who accepts the authority of the God-intime. Faith is a passion in which reason can accept its own inability to understand the Absolute Paradox, but nevertheless makes that Paradox the basis for
the whole of life. The authority of reason is teleologically suspended for the
person of faith by the higher authority of the presence of the God-in-time.
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The concept of authority is more overtly central to The Concept of Anxiety
and Concluding Unscientific Postscript (especially with respect to "religiousness B"), and surprisingly prominent in Works of Love, as well as the stridently Christian writings of Anti-Climacus. That some earlier commentators on Kierkegaard failed to see the fundamental importance of the concept for him testifies eloquently to the baneful influence twentieth century
existentialism had on Kierkegaard interpretation back in the days when he
was viewed primarily as the "father" of that movement.' Some of this misinterpretation is doubtless motivated by misguided charity; thinkers who
admire Kierkegaard and consider the notion of religious authority to be
indefensible have great difficulty in believing Kierkegaard can be committed to the concept.
Yet it is easy to see that religious authority is not for Kierkegaard in tension with fear and trembling but one of its constituents. Kierkegaard never
takes seriously the kind of radical Sartrean autonomy in which the self creates itself. From his viewpoint, the self is always grounded on a "criterion"
that is higher than the self.s Our ideal selves cannot be created from nothing; meaning and truth cannot be generated ex nihilo. The possibility of
"the individual" who is not completely a product of the social system, the
individual who does not worship the state as the highest expression of
society, depends upon the individual's finding a source of meaning that is
for the individual higher than that which grounds the social system.
Insofar as "reason" is simply the concrete expression of the patterns of
thinking that form the basis of that same social system, such an individual
is necessarily committed to an "authority" that he or she will not be able to
justify to society at large.

III. The Dangers of Subjectivism
Despite, or perhaps because of, the centrality of the related concepts of
authority and revelation, Kierkegaard is keenly conscious of the dangers of
authority. In fact, it is fair to say that Kierkegaard is every bit as aware of
the dangers of uncontrolled subjective commitments as are the
Enlightenment defenders of reason. In so early a work as Fear and
Trembling the pseudonym Joham1es de Silentio explicitly raises the question as to whether or not the hearer of a sermon on Abraham's willingness
to sacrifice Isaac might in a delusion go home and want to sacrifice his own
children. Silentio worries about whether he dares "to speak unreservedly
about Abraham without running the risk that some individual will become
unbalanced and do the same thing."9 The appalling thing about the
Abraham story is precisely the fact that there appears to be no sure rational
criteria for distinguishing Abraham from a murderer.
Given the dangers, why does Silentio go on to speak about Abraham?
The answer, I believe, is that Abraham's story exemplifies a possibility that
is crucial for genuinely human existence. To talk about Abraham is to talk
about what cannot be justified by appeal to the rational discourse of the
existing order, but if we cannot talk about Abraham, then we have in effect
deified that existing order of things. If the established order is in effect deified then the possibility of a radical critique of the existing order is preclud-
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ed. Also precluded is the possibility that a human being can fulfill his or
her humanness in ways that the existing order does not sanction. If that
existing order is in some ways destructive of genuine human life, then the
danger of ignoring Abraham is even greater than the danger of speaking
about him. Abraham is important because "it is one thing to be admired
and another to become a guiding star that saves the anguished."lO
Similarly, in Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Johannes Climacus
acknowledges the dangers of what he calls "the subjective type of madness." In the course of his defense of "truth as subjectivity" he recognizes
how difficult it is to distinguish such truth from insanity. "In a solely subjective definition of truth, lunacy and truth are ultimately indistinguishable, because they both may have inwardness."ll Climacus does not minimize the danger that this close resemblance creates. In fact, he acknowledges that this danger lies behind the appeal of Enlightenment objectivity,
which promises protection against subjectivity.
The Enlightenment fear of "enthusiasm" might appear to be quite different from this Kierkegaardian fear of madness. However, in both cases
we have what might be called "uncontrolled subjectivity." Kierkegaard
considers the case of madness simply because it is an extreme kind of
uncontrolled subjectivity. One might here consider the fact that in extreme
cases of subjectivity gone awry, such as Heaven's Gate or the mass suicide
of Jim Jones's followers, there is a strong tendency for outsiders to say that
such uncontrolled "enthusiasm" is a form of insanity. One might say that
Kierkegaard wishes to look at the worst-case scenario for subjectivity. The
challenge to the proponent of subjectivity goes something like this: Once
you have allowed subjectivity to escape the control of reason, what is to
block it from the kinds of excesses indistinguishable from madness?
Kierkegaard's reply to this argument is essentially to claim that there is
no way to avoid the danger of madness. If one eliminates subjectivity, one
may well avoid the possibility of one type of madness but foster the possibility of what he terms the "objective" kind of madness, in which subjectivity or inwardness is eliminated and genuine human life is simply abolished. A completely objective human being would be a kind of machine:
an "artificial product" with "glass eyes" and "hair made from a floor mat."
The purely objective person is imagined as a kind of robot, a "walking
stick" with a mechanical contrivance inside to produce speech. 12
Hence, in both Fear and Trembling and Postscript there is actually a link
between subjectivity and authority. Contrary to critics who see the two as
opposed, the subjective individual is someone who has a foundation for
the self that cannot be justified by appeal to the criteria embedded in the
practices and discourse of the social establishment. Hence, the subjective
individual is someone who is grounded in and at least implicitly appeals to
a higher authority that provides that foundation. The dangers of such an
appeal to authority are fully acknowledged, but the argument is that the
dangers created by eliminating such appeals are even greater.
There is a parallel between this argument and one that employs the language of American political discourse. Freedom of speech and religion
give rise to movements like Heaven's Gate, and the dangers of such fanaticism are obvious. However, the restrictions on freedom of speech and reli-
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gion that would be required to eliminate such movements would harm
society even more by squelching any movement that poses radically new
ideas and challenges.
However, even if this Kierkegaardian argument is sound, it does not follow that complacency with respect to the dangers of appeals to authority is
justified. Kierkegaard clearly believes that no sure-fire method of rational
evaluation can be used to screen candidates for religious authority, if by
"rational evaluation" we mean a process that appeals only to generally
accepted norms and practices. For such a method of evaluation will necessarily rule against any truly radical challenge to those norms and practices.
However, though we may not have an algorithmic method to distinguish
what we might call authentic religious authorities from lunatics, it does not
follow from this that decisions about authority are made blindly. Once the
impossibility of any definitive rational justification of an authority is
admitted, it is tempting to go the "existentialist" route and regard commitment to an authority as a kind of personal "radical choice/' made without
reasons. However, Kierkegaard himself does not view matters that way.
As he sees it, an individual who trusts an authority necessarily does so in
"fear and trembling" because of the lack of objective rational justification.
However, the fear and trembling also implies that the choice must be one
that is made with great care. The underlying assumption is that both the
person who makes a claim to be an authority and the person who trusts an
alleged authority can be deluded. One can be right or wrong about such
things. It is this possibility that produces the anxiety on the part of the individual dealing with authority. But that anxiety also means the choice
should be made with care. The lack of any algorithmic justification does not
mean that there are no criteria to help a person decide whether a claim to
authority is justified. In his writings Kierkegaard himself, even though he
claims that there is no objective proof for the validity of a revelation, presents a number of criteria that he thinks will help the individual decide
when authority is genuine. In the next section I shall try to examine a number of these criteria and also ask some questions about their adequacy.

IV. Criteria for Genuine Authority
The criteria suggested in Kierkegaard's writings for distinguishing a
genuine revelation seem to be mainly negative in character. That is, there
are certain characteristics that, when present, will disqualify an alleged
revelation. Such characteristics always, however, fall short of positive
proof that a candidate is a genuine revelation. One can at most say that a
revelation-claimant that passes these tests is still a live candidate. We will
examine several of these negative criteria, looking at various works in
Kierkegaard's authorship. There are of course significant differences
between the person who must decide whether or not he or she has been
given a revelation and thus possesses religious authority and the person
who must decide whether or not to believe someone else who claims such
authority. However, in both cases the essential factor is a decision as to
whether or not a revelation has really been given and whether or not
authority is therefore really present. In my discussion I shall range freely
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over such concepts as "the knight of faith" from Fear and Trembling and
"the apostle" and the "extraordinary" from The Book on Adler, since in all
these cases something like an authorizing revelation that cannot be rationally justified is present.
The most important of Kierkegaard's works on this topic is of course The
Book on Adler. This work was inspired by the case of Danish pastor,
Adolph Adler, who was deposed by the Church because he claimed to
have received a direct revelation from Jesus Christ. Kierkegaard was fascinated by the case because of what he thought it revealed about "the modem age," and he produced no fewer than three different versions of a book
on religious authority that focuses on Adler. Kierkegaard never published
the work as a whole, chiefly because of concerns about its effect on Adler
as a human being, though parts of it, mainly the essay liThe Difference
Between a Genius and an Apostle," were included in other worksY

1. Reliance on Authority: Rejection of the Philosophical and the Aesthetic.
The first criterion presented, one fundamental to Kierkegaard, is that the
individual who is entrusted with a revelation must appeal to the revelation
itself as the ground of his or her message. In The Book on Adler Kierkegaard
argues that Adler flunks this test in his later writings by presenting himself
in the guise of a genius. However much or little genius is shown by
Adler's writings is beside the point, however, since Adler had earlier
claimed to have received a revelation from God, and such a claim to
authority is qualitatively distinct from any claim to genius. Thus, if someone propounds a doctrine and argues that it is philosophically so profound
or aesthetically so beautiful that it must be something revealed by God,
then the person making the claim is fundamentally confused: "the one
called by a revelation, to whom a doctrine is entrusted, argues on the basis
that it is a revelation, on the basis that he has authority. I am not obliged to
listen to Paul because he is brilliant or matchlessly brilliant, but I must submit to Paul because he has divine authority."14
Kierkegaard's point here rests on the traditional claim that the person
of faith believes what God reveals because God reveals it. IS If I believe
what God reveals only because I have myself independently determined
that the content of the revelation is true, then my belief is not grounded
in trust in God and does not count as an expression of faith in God.
Hence the bearer of a revelation ought to ask for belief on the grounds of
the revelation itself; to ask for belief on philosophical or aesthetical
grounds is not to ask for faith at all.
However sensible this appears, there is a difficulty. Essentially, the criterion does not determine whether or not a revelation claim is genuine, but
only whether the bearer of the revelation claim is clear about the nature of
a revelation. In other words, it seems possible for God to grant a revelation
to someone such as Adler who might be confused about the nature of a
revelation. In that case there would be a genuine revelation, and what
might be called objective authority, but the confused individual would present the revelation in such a form that it would fail the criterion
Kierkegaard presents.
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Nevertheless, the criterion Kierkegaard presents can be defended
despite this difficulty. One might argue that clarity about the nature of a
revelation would accompany a genuine revelation. Either God would not
give a religiously confused individual a revelation, or else God would
intervene in that person's consciousness to bring about the necessary clarity. Kierkegaard believes that people who have received a special revelation from God (prophets and apostles-these two categories are obviously
different but Kierkegaard considers them together insofar as both make a
claim to be the bearer of a special revelation that has authority) would have
a consciousness of having received such a revelation and would have at
least some consciousness of the special status this implies. Thus, a criterion
of being a genuine prophet or apostle is a consciousness that one is a
prophet or apostle and at least some degree of clarity about what that role
entails. Obviously, this does not mean that all prophets and apostles
understand themselves in precisely the same way; the calling of the apostle
might be different from that of the prophet and even within these general
categories there might be lots of individual differences. But this is compatible with the claim that all of them would have at least some consciousness
of being authorized in some way to speak God's word.
If we assume that God is not a God of confusion, then this reply seems
plausible, at least to me, though objections could certainly be raised and
speculation about what God would and would not do is always a bit
uncertain. Nevertheless this reply, if it is what Kierkegaard would say at
this point, does require some modification, or at least nuancing, of his position. For his position seems to be that divine authorization is completely
"other" and thus cannot be recognized from any human characteristics.
One cannot reason from the fact that the Reverend Moon is a genius to the
conclusion that the Reverend Moon is an apostle. But the reply I have put
in Kierkegaard's mouth does imply that the genuine apostle will exhibit
one recognizable human trait: clarity about religious concepts. We may
not expect St. Paul to be a philosophical or literary genius, but we may at
least expect him to be clear-headed about what it means to be an apostle.
And if there is at least one recognizable trait an apostle displays, we might
well ask whether or not there are other traits that we would expect an
apostle to exhibit as well. If so, though we cannot and should not seek to
abolish authority by believing the authority only when we have
autonomously concluded the message delivered is true, we may legitimately inquire as to whether or not the authority is genuine. Insofar as
such an inquiry relies on recognizable criteria, it will be at least partly rational, even if it cannot establish any conclusions with certainty.

2. Rejection of Power and Politics; Acceptance of Solitude and Failure
A second criterion is also derived by Kierkegaard from the means the
revelation-bearer uses to advance the claimed revelation. This criterion can
be summed up in the claim that a person who has genuinely received a revelation will not use worldly means to ensure the triumph of the revelation,
but will rest content in God's providence. This person will not manipulate
or coerce others into accepting the revelation, and he or she does not fear
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rejection, confident that the ultimate outcome is in God's hands.
This criterion is presented as early as Fear and Trembling, where
Johannes de Silentio argues that the true "knight of faith," who has an individual relation to the absolute that shapes his life, can be distinguished
from a counterfeit version by the appearance of "sectarianism" in the counterfeit. The "sectarian" attempts to assure himself that he is genuinely
called by God by getting the approval of a group of human admirers, "a
few good friends and comrades."16 The genuine knight of faith has no
need of such human confirmation, but "is a witness, never the teacher."17
A closely related theme is developed at more length in The Book on Adler,
where it is maintained that the genuine apostle cannot use worldly means
to ensure the success of his cause. Kierkegaard says that tl10ugh it might
be possible for an apostle to have "power in the worldly sense," so that he
"had great influence and powerful connections, by which forces one is victorious over people's opinions and judgments," if he actually uses this
power "he eo ipso would have forfeited his cause."'S A genuine apostle
must not define his cause in such a way that it can be confused with any
human enterprise, but the spurious "man of movement" must have "the
majority in order to obtain certainty" that he truly has had a revelation. I'!
This implies that the genuine apostle has a certain indifference to the success of his or her cause. The true extraordinary figure will "jest lightly
about being victorious in the world, because he knows very well that if only
everything is in order with his relation to God, his idea will surely succeed,
even if he falls."20 The genuine revelation recipient will exhibit no impatience, but will be content to allow God's timing to play itself out, content to
suffer the loss of everything for the sake of the doctrine bequeathed to him.21
This second criterion raises the same kind of critical question as did the
first criterion, since once more it seems we have a criterion by which to recognize a genuine bearer of a revelation, rather than a criterion of whether a
revelation is genuine. Even if Kierkegaard is right about the proper stance
of an apostle or other revelation claimant, it seems possible for someone
who has had a genuine revelation to fail to display the appropriate stance
by behaving in a worldly manner. The criterion would in that case rule out
a genuine revelation.
However, it also seems possible to respond to this objection as in the first
case, by hypothesizing that God would not grant to a worldly person a genuine revelation, or else that God would shape the life of the apostle in such
a way that the person would not behave in a worldly manner. And this
kind of hypothesis certainly has some plausibility; in fact it fits the traditional claim that genuine sanctity or holiness is one criterion of a true prophet.
One might object to this in two ways. First, one might argue that at least
some Biblical prophets do not meet this criterion. Think for example of
Deborah and some of the other judges, who are both prophets and temporal
leaders, employing what Kierkegaard would term "worldly" instruments
such as military force. In response to this, I think that Kierkegaard's concept
of the "prophet" is strongly marked by his reading of the New Testament,
where the model of the one who speaks for God is Jesus of Nazareth, who
refuses to call legions of angels to rescue him from the cross and restrains his
own followers from taking up the sword on his behalf. Nevertheless, the
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kind of theme Kierkegaard is stressing is not absent from the Old Testament,
even if it is not consistently exemplified there. Old Testament prophets also
urge the people of God to put their trust in Yahweh rather than the horses
and chariots of Pharaoh. The story of Gideon even exemplifies this theme in
a story of a military engagement, since in the story God tells Gideon to send
away most of his army, on the grounds that if the army is too large, people
will think that Israel was rescued by ordinary military might rather than the
power of God. 22
The second objection is that one might think that Kierkegaard's concept of
the worldly is too vague. Is "being worldly" to be contrasted with "being
godly or spiritual" or is it to be equated with using ordinary forms of worldly power? Certainly, there are alternative concepts of what it means to be
spiritual and worldly and on some of these, Kierkegaard's use of the "worldly" may look like equivocation. However, to him the worldly person is simply the person who is not rooted in faith, and a life that is not rooted in faith
can manifest itself in worldliness in the sense of debauchery, but also in
worldliness in the sense of being completely reliant on what we might call
nahlral means of achieving results. This is not to say that a spiritual person
in his sense does not employ natural means and live an ordinary life. It does
mean that a truly spiritual person does not put ultimate trust in such natural
means, particularly with respect to the achievement of spiritual ends. The
transmission of a message from God would be a spiritual end par excellence,
and so he thinks that deep faith and trust in God is a characteristic that one
would expect to see in a true prophet, and such a faith is incompatible with
the attitude of the person who relies on worldly power to achieve results.
I think that this criterion is a particularly valuable one in the contemporary world, since most if not all of the evils done by people who claim to
have had a revelation from God seem to involve some kind of desire for
worldly power or control, either over a small or large group. Like
Enlightenment thinkers, I am leery of thinkers who have a truth they are
willing to kill for. However, an alleged prophet who shows no desire to
dominate or oppress others, but is willing to suffer oppression for the sake
of the message seems quite different. Kierkegaard's sure grasp of this
point is partly what lies behind his own later emphasis on the martyr as
the genuine "witness to the truth."
But once more this implies that there are criteria for recognizing a genuine
apostle or prophet, and applying those criteria would seem to be partly a matter of employing human reason, since recognition of someone as employing
worldly means or craving social approval would seem to require only natural
human capacities. Such criteria would be very far from allowing someone to
determine the truth of a revelation claim with objective certainty. This is partly because the criteria are mostly negative in character and are in any case necessarily imprecise in their application. However, there is no reason to think
that the application of such criteria would be unimportant.

3. Paradoxicalness of the Revelation
A third criterion offered in Kierkegaard's writings applies more directly
to the revelation itself, rather than the person receiving the revelation. A
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genuine revelation would be marked, he thinks, by paradoxicalness. In
The Book on Adler the alleged apostle is also described as "paradoxical," but
in this case the characteristic is also applicable to the revelation itself and
perhaps is applied to the apostle insofar as he is related to the revelation.
That the apostle is sent by God is a paradoxical fact, but the content of his
message is essentially paradoxical as welp3
The nature of paradoxicalness is a huge and much-debated topic in
Kierkegaard interpretation, but it is at least clear in this context that the
paradoxicalness of a revelation is supposed to function as a criterion of its
"transcendent" character. A merely human idea or theory, even one that
originates with genius, always lies within what Kierkegaard calls "immanence." A genuine revelation retains the character of transcendence:
"However long it is proclaimed in the world, it remains essentially just as
new, just as paradoxical; no immanence can assimilate it."24
That paradoxicalness functions as a criterion of the genuineness of a revelation is obscured by Kierkegaard's emphasis on the tension between
human reason and the paradoxical, perhaps explored most systematically
by Johannes Climacus in Philosophical Fragments, who describes faith as
directed at the "absolute paradox" that God entered time as a human
being. Since human reason as it actually exists is seen as dominated by
assumptions of autonomy and self-sufficiency, the contact between reason
and a paradox is marked by a clash, and faith in the paradox is regularly
described as involving a belief that is "against the understanding."
However, we must remember that this clash is not a necessary one. It is
true that it is natural for human reason to take offense at the paradox, but it
is not necessary. It is also possible for reason and the paradox to be on
good terms, in the happy passion of faith.25
The moral of the appendix to Chapter 3 of Fragments is that the offended consciousness is actually a kind of confirmation of the genuineness of
the paradox. One should expect human reason to be offended by a genuine revelation from God. When reason objects that it cannot understand
the paradox, the response of the paradox is simply "Of course you do not
understand. The only problem is that you somehow think this is an
objection, instead of recognizing that it is in fact one sign that we have a
genuine revelation."26
What I think lies behind this is simply the recognition that a genuine
revelation from God would be expected to contain truths that human reason could not discover on its own, and even truths that reason could not
understand after they have been revealed. And here Kierkegaard's view is
actually rather traditional. Thomas Aquinas, for example, claims that God
proposes things to man "that surpass reason" because we only know God
truly "when we believe him to be above everything that is possible for man
to think about him."27 One of the criteria Aquinas then offers for the genuineness of the Christian revelation is that it contains "truths that surpass
every human intellect."2s An alleged revelation that contained only what
humans could discover for themselves might be thought superfluous at
best. At the very least, both Kierkegaard and Aquinas seem to think that
such a revelation would lack something that one would expect to find in a
genuine revelation.

KIERKEGAARD ON RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY

59

This emphasis on paradoxicalness is quite pervasive in Kierkegaard's
writings. A good illustration is found in Works of Love, where Kierkegaard
argues that the divine origin of the command to love one's neighbor as
oneself can be seen from the fact that this command has a transcendent
character. This command "turns the natural man's conceptions and ideas
upside down."29 It is not a command that "arose in any human being's
heart" but "breaks forth with divine origination" precisely" at the boundary where human language halts and courage fails."30 Kierkegaard argues
that our familiarity with Christianity blinds us to its otherness: "Take a
pagan who is not spoiled by having learned thoughtlessly to patter
Christianity by rote or has not been spoiled by the delusion of being a
Christian-and this commandment, 'You shall love,' will not only surprise
him but will disturb him, will be an offense to him."3]
This third criterion raises many difficult issues. What should we say
about the idea that one mark of a true divine revelation will be a paradoxical
character, in the sense that it will contain truths that will strike us as strange,
disturbing, or even repellent? I think this criterion, like the first two, is genuinely useful, but it is far from giving us any kind of "method" for discerning a genuine revelation. It could be used to eliminate some potential revelation claims. It also gives us a reason not to reject new revelation claims too
quickly, for the fact that we find them unappealing may actually be a sign of
their genuineness. The problem of course is that merely being strange and
unappealing would not seem to go very far in distinguishing a genuine revelation from cases like Heaven's Gate. It would seem that for this criterion to
be genuinely useful, Kierkegaard would need to distinguish between the
kind of absurdity that is a criterion of transcendence and more garden varieties of absurdity.
I believe that this is not impossible for Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard himself
insists that "not every absurdity is the absurd or the paradox," and that one
must make a distinction between the paradox and "nonsense."32 We can
make a start here by clearly distinguishing between a paradox and a formal
logical contradiction, though many commentators have confused the twO. 33
More progress can be made by exploring what might be termed the "fit"
between an alleged revelation and the human condition, in which the revelation can be seen in some sense to answer the questions to which humans
must seek answers. Such a fit would be far from proof, since there are many
rival answers that might constitute answers to these questions. And such a
criterion would not illegitimately introduce a philosophical judgment on the
content of the revelation, since the "fitness" of the answers provided could
be seen as in some sense part of the form of the revelation, that aspect of the
revelation that makes it a genuine candidate, so to speak. Kierkegaard's
authorship as a whole can be seen in part as an exploration of this kind of fit
between Christian faith and the situation of existing human beings. For
now, I must leave this topic as an important one for further work. I will note
only that one must clearly be careful in how one goes about the project. The
distinction cannot be made by any kind of appeal to existing criteria of rationality that are used to judge the content of the revelation without relinquishing the claim that a revelation must be accepted on the basis of authority and
that such authority is vitiated by any appeal to existing rational standards.
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V. Miracles and Faith

Kierkegaard's claim that a revelation must be accepted on the basis of
authority and that this precludes any appeal to rational criteria seems to be
in tension with his own attempt to provide criteria for recognizing a genuine revelation, or at least detecting a spurious one. He needs such criteria
unless a commitment to a revelation is a kind of "criterionless radical
choice" made for no reasons at alt a view that Kierkegaard clearly wishes
to reject. His own ambivalence on this question can be seen in his claim
that an apostle has no other evidence than his own statement, and at most
his willingness to suffer everything joyfully for the sake of that statement."34 Here he seems to want to have it both ways, saying that the apostle has only his own assertion as evidence, but then adding that he has" at
most" the evidence of his willingness to suffer for his cause, which is to
appeal to evidence from the character of the life of the apostle, evidence
that is certainly not identical with a mere claim on the part of the alleged
apostle. I think what we should say here is that though Kierkegaard flirts
with the possibility that the choice to accept a revelation cannot appeal to
any criteria at alt the fact that he himself tries to specify criteria of authenticity that have at least some value in eliminating some candidates shows
that this is not his considered view.
Kierkegaard's aversion to rational evaluation of revelation claims is
based on analogies such as the following. If one obeys a king's orders only
because the order is witty or profound, one is actually being disloyal to the
king. 35 If a son obeys a father's orders only when those orders appear reasonable to the son, then the son does not really obey the father.36 If a citizen
obeys a police order only in cases where the order makes sense to the citizen, the citizen similarly is not in fact accepting the authority of the police,
even if the citizen in fact behaves as someone would who is obeying the
police command. 37 These analogies are only analogies, since Kierkegaard
holds that human authority is always relative and transitory in nature,
while divine authority is absolute. 38 This difference does not, however,
prevent us from seeing something of the character of divine authority from
looking at cases of legitimate human authority. The specific lesson drawn
is that I cannot be said to obey God or trust God if J follow a divine command only in cases where I have independently discovered or certified the
wisdom of the command.
However, even if we accept this point, a more careful look at these
analogies shows that reason can be used here in two different ways, corresponding to a distinction between the source of the revelation and the content of the revelation. It is one thing to accept a father's commands only
when the son or daughter has independently certified the wisdom of the
commands. But what about the case when a command appears that claims
to be from the father, but where this is not known with certainty? It
appears that a careful investigation of the question as to whether or not an
order is really an order from the father does not show any refusal to accept
the father's authority. In fact, such an investigation could be demanded by
true filial devotion, for one would not want to obey an imposter, but only
the true father.
/I
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Such an investigation of the origin of the command would not necessarily have to take the form of an independent certification of the truth of the
message that contains the command, for such a certification might be
impossible even if it were desirable, and the devoted son or daughter will
not require this kind of backing. Rather, the son or daughter wants some
kind of certification, not of the content of the message, but of the fact that
the message truly comes from the father. One might look for a signature,
for example, or some peculiar trait that identifies the message as coming
from the father. Such certification would not be objectively certain; signatures can be forged, for example. Nevertheless, it might be important to
the child who is prepared to obey the father.
What might the analogous "signature" be in the case of a message from
God? One traditional answer is that a genuine revelation would be accompanied by miracles. To quote Thomas Aquinas: "A visible action that can
only be divine reveals an invisibly inspired teacher of truth."39
Kierkegaard's own account differs most significantly from traditional
Christian views precisely by ignoring or tmderplaying the role of such miracles. He certainly considers miracles but dismisses them as providing any
help on the grounds that miracles give "no physical certainty" since a miracle is itself something accepted by faith. 4u
There are different reasons given here for dismissing miracles as providing much help in recognizing a revelation as genuine. Miracles may be
inadequate because they do not provide evidence that gives "physical certainty," by which I think Kierkegaard probably means evidence that is
empirical in character and compelling. The problem might be that the evidence for a miracle is not fully empirical, or the problem might be simply
that the evidence fails to be compelling, and therefore fails to provide
objective certainty. (Obviously, one reason it might fail to be compelling
for some people is by failing to be completely empirical in nature.) Yet
another reason, which mayor may not be distinct from these first two, is
that a miracle cannot provide a basis for faith because it itself requires faith.
However, none of these reasons seems adequate to me for completely
rejecting the value of miracles in the discernment of a revelation.
We might first focus on the notion of "physical certainty." It is not completely clear what this might be, but we might take him to be speaking of a
kind of certainty analogous to that obtained by the kind of scientific experiment in which a causal agent is directly observed. It is clear that miracles do
not offer this kind of certainty. The evidence provided by a miracle seems
far removed from that of a scientific experiment for several reasons. The
case of the miracle, by hypothesis, will not be repeatable, and in calling an
event a miracle one necessarily refers to God or some other supernatural
agent who cannot be directly observed. (Though it should be noted that the
contrast is not as sharp as it might appear, since many scientific entities are
theoretical and unobservable.) Non-miraculous explanations will always be
possible, and hence the assurance provided neither seems purely sensible or
empirical. Nor does it appear to be certain in any objective sense. However,
why should one expect that reasons for accepting a revelation as genuine
would have to meet such criteria? Evidence that is not completely empirical
and is less than objectively certain could still be important as evidence.
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Nor does the fact that faith is required to discern a miracle necessarily
mean that the miracle is unimportant. In Kierkegaard's language, faith is a
passion that transforms a person and gives that person an ability to see the
world differently. A person of faith thus might have skills that others lack.
The idea that there are certain kinds of evidence that cannot be discerned if
an individual lacks certain skills or capacities is not at all strange; there are
many analogies in science and ordinary life. It may be true both that faith
is required to discern a miracle and yet also true that the miracle could be
important in strengthening and confirming faith. (Of course the person of
faith could be transformed by the miracle so that the faith required to recognize the miracle is not precisely the same as the faith that is present after
the miracle has been recognized.) In this case the miracle would not constitute evidence if by "evidence" we mean data that would be obvious to
anyone, but the failure of Enlightenment epistemology shows how unrealistic such a concept of evidence is. I conclude that there is no good reason
why Kierkegaard should not recognize the legitimacy of his own practice
in giving criteria for the genuineness of a revelation, and no good reason
why he should not extend the criteria he himself gives, notably by adding
the criterion of miracles as signs of the divine origin of a revelation.

VI. Externalism and Non-Evidential Accounts of Belief in Authority
If Kierkegaard rejects the "existentialist" theory of radical choice as an
explanation of how a religious authority is accepted, one may still ask how
he thinks the commitment to an authority is made. Specifically, why does
evidence play so little role in his account? Perhaps Kierkegaard is uninterested in the kind of evidence miracles might provide because of what
might be termed the problem of the incommensurability between faith
commitment and intellectual evidence, a problem discussed at length by
his pseudonym Johannes Climacus in Part I of Concluding Unscientific
Postscript. Even if there is evidence that supports the claims of a religious
authority, there is a gap between the certainty provided by that evidence
and the kind of total commitment demanded by someone who claims to
speak on behalf of God.
Perhaps it is for this reason that John Calvin and other Reformed theologians have rejected the idea that an acceptance of Biblical authority could
be based on arguments or evidence, in favor of the idea that a commitment
to Biblical authority is rooted directly in what they term "the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit.//4! This idea is often interpreted in an evidential
manner as an appeal to an unverifiable inner experience, a kind of inferior,
subjective evidence. However, there are good reasons to think that Calvin
is not here talking about evidence at all, in the sense of appealing to any
propositional fact that is to serve as the basis of some process of inference.
Rather, he may be taken as claiming that belief in the authority is epistemologically basic, in much the same way as ordinary perceptual beliefs are
claimed to be basic. The witness of the Spirit is a theological explanation of
how the belief is produced, not a description of evidence to which the
believer must appea1. 42 If Calvin's views here are interpreted in accordance
with an externalist epistemology, the fact that the beliefs are not based on
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evidence does not disqualify them as knowledge, since on such an epistemology, beliefs produced by a reliable process or faculty may qualify as
knowledge. 43
There are some respects in which Calvin's account seems similar to
views found in Kierkegaard's writings. In Philosophical Fragments, faith
(which clearly includes belief in the divine authority of the object of faith)
is said to be a gift of God which results from a first-hand awareness of God
in time. There is no explicit discussion of the internal witness of the Spirit
here, but there is a claim that faith results from some kind of direct interaction between the individual and God, and one could view Calvin's account
as simply an attempt to describe the nature of this interaction in more
specifically Trinitarian terms. The thrust of the discussion in Fragments is
that objective evidence is lmimportant, if by "evidence" one means to refer
to that which can be known in a "neutral" or "objective" manner. Rather,
in the appearance of the God in time, we have a reality that can only be
known when the person is gripped by the passion of faith, which is directly created by God. So Calvin and Kierkegaard would agree that little can
be known about God "objectively" (though they would I think also agree
that what can be known about God is objectively true).
However, although an externalist epistemology may make evidence
unnecessary, it is not clear to me that such a position rules out any role for
evidence. How exactly are we to think of evidence here? If evidence is
taken as providing conclusive support for a commitment, support which is
supposed to be recognizable by anyone, then it does seem that such evidence for religious authority will be insufficient to ground a commitment.
However, such a concept of evidence seems rooted in Enlightenment epistemology, which attempts to show how human knowledge can be built on
a foundation of objective certainty. A more chastened epistemology will
recognize that almost no significant human knowledge is rooted in such
evidence. Such an epistemology will be open to the possibility that there
might be evidence that can only be discerned or appreciated from a particular perspective. Recently, William Wainwright has argued in Reason and
the Heart for the possibility that faith might be based on evidence, but that
the evidence might be such that a particular form of subjectivity is necessary to grasp the evidence, and illustrated this perspective by a look at
Jonathan Edwards, John Henry Newman, and William James. 44 However,
the fact that the evidence may not be generally available does not entail
that it is not important for the individual who sees the evidence as evidence, nor that the evidence does not playa key role for that individual.
To use Calvin's language, one way that the witness of tl1e Spirit might be
carried out would be by the Spirit drawing the attention of the individual
to evidence and enabling the individual rightly to interpret and assess that
evidence. If this is right, then it seems that Kierkegaard's claim that miracles require faith themselves does not rule out a search for criteria for genuine religious authority, and in particular, considering the traditional function of miracles as providing one such criterion.
I am not here claiming that either Kierkegaard or Calvin should be considered evidentialists, even Wainwright-type evidentialists. Kierkegaard in
particular seems positively allergic to evidentialist apologetic arguments.
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Rather, the claim is that non-evidentialist accounts such as theirs can consistently allow evidence a valuable and helpful role in making sense of religious beliefs, particularly beliefs grounded in authoritative revelation claims.

VII. Conclusions: Particularism and Universalism
As I noted at the beginning, the Enlightenment has a certain suspicion of
the idea of an authoritative revelation. Of course the category is not rejected outright, and some thinkers are more hospitable to revelation than others. Even Kant, the quintessential Enlightenment thinker, says that "no
one can deny the possibility that a scripture, which, in practical content,
contains much that is godly, may (with respect to what is historical in it) be
regarded as a genuinely divine revelation."45 Nevertheless, though Kant
allows for the possibility of a divine revelation, he thinks that one ought to
think of such a revelation as a vehicle for the introduction and transmission
of "pure moral faith," which depends on practical reason alone. II[R]ecognition and respect must be accorded, in Christian dogmatic, to universal
human reason as the supremely commanding principle in a natural religion, and the revealed doctrine, upon which a church is founded ... must
be cherished and cultivated as merely a means, but a most precious means,
of making this doctrine comprehensible, ... "16 The pure religion of reason
may first have become known to humans through an historical revelation,
but eventually the truths contained in that religion can be based on reason:
"Hence a revelation ... at a given time and in a given place might well be
wise and very advantageous to the human race, in that, when once the religion thus introduced is here, and has been made known publicly, everyone
can henceforth by himself and with his own reason convince himself of its
truth.// 47
This kind of Enlightenment view, which can be seen even more clearly
in Lessing, is committed to epistemological universalism, the idea that
truth should ideally be accessible to everyone. This kind of position
eschews all particularities, and simply leaves no room for a determinate
revelation whose content cannot be assessed by universal criteria.
Postmodemism has rejected the epistemologies of the Enlightenment but
remains hostile to the notion of an authoritative revelation. However, if
postmodemism is really to take particularism seriously, it ought to begin to
consider the notion that a person could be defined by a commitment to a
revelation that cannot be justified by Enlightenment standards.
Another way of making this point is by reflection on what Roderick
Chisholm has called lithe problem of the criterion.// 48 In attempting to
develop criteria for knowledge, it would be nice to develop criteria whose
validity could be recognized independently of any actual knowledge
claims. Such criteria could then provide a secure foundation for knowledge claims. However, Chisholm argues that this is impossible. The proper way to proceed in epistemology is to begin with examples of what we
actually know and then to reflect on those examples, so as to see if criteria
can be developed to account for what we know. The criteria, obviously,
are dependent on our willingness to commit ourselves to certain items of
knowledge.
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In a similar manner, we would like to have criteria for genuine religious
authority that could be developed antecedently to accepting any such
authority, so as to provide a justification for such acceptance. However, it
may be that this is impossible. We can no more hope to develop criteria for
religious authority without accepting some actual examples than we could
hope to develop criteria for recognizing works of art without reflecting on
works of art that are already accepted as works of art. The status of some
of these accepted works may of course be challenged and revised after
reflection, but no progress can be made without some commitment to what
is to count as art.
The individual who is seeking religious truth does not see the world sub
specie aeternitatis but stands at a particular historical spot. The "spots"
where people stand may well be partially shaped by their faith commitments, but that does not preclude a concern for truth. I conclude that there
is no contradiction between Kierkegaard's thesis that a revelation claim
must be accepted on the basis of the authority of the revelation and his
own attempt to develop criteria for discerning a genuine authority. Rather,
his own criteria should be further developed and additional criteria, such
as the accompaniment of a revelation by miracles, should be developed as
well. Such criteria can never provide objective certainty; they are neither
absolutely certain nor discernible independently of the individual's subjective commitments. They do not provide a secure foundation in the
Enlightenment sense, and they do not eliminate the dangers inherent in
any commitment to authority. However, this does not mean that these
rational criteria are not important. Such criteria may help a person make
sense of a commitment that is not an arbitrary" criterionless radical
choice."
The picture of the person as being required to justify a commitment to
religious authority from some kind of neutral standpoint must be rejected.
Kierkegaard and Calvin are right to argue for the possibility that an
encounter with a revelation may itself transform the individual in such a
way that the truth of the revelation becomes evident to the person.
However, there is no reason to rule out the possibility that this transformation might involve the use of rational criteria.
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